The ECI’s Move to Link EPIC with Aadhaar: A Double-Edged Sword in the Fight Against Illegal Voting
OPINION & ANALYSIS
Imphal: In a significant development announced on March 18, 2025, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has revived its plan to link Electoral Photo Identity Cards (EPIC) with Aadhaar numbers, aiming to bolster electoral integrity by detecting and eliminating fake voters. This initiative, rooted in a high-level meeting led by Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar, comes amid growing concerns over electoral fraud and duplicate voter registrations across India.
Gyanesh Kumar, Chief Election Commissioner
Former CM N. Biren Singh
Nowhere is this issue more pressing than in the border state of Manipur, where former Chief Minister N. Biren Singh has long highlighted the proliferation of fake Aadhaar and voter ID cards, allegedly used to legitimize illegal immigrants from Myanmar. Singh welcomed the ECI’s move, emphasizing its potential to address a problem he claims has compromised Manipur’s electoral rolls, citing the 2019 Electoral Verification Programme in Manipur, which identified and removed 67,844 fake voters. He further revealed that 24,636 of these were from a single district, highlighting the scale of electoral malpractice. Singh welcomed the Election Commission’s decision as described it as a crucial step toward transparency and fraud prevention.
However, while the proposal promises enhanced transparency, it also raises critical questions about privacy, exclusion, and implementation challenges.
Biometrics collection of illegal immigrants
The Pros: Strengthening Electoral Integrity
The primary argument in favor of linking EPIC with Aadhaar is its potential to purify India’s electoral rolls, a long-standing goal of the ECI. By integrating Aadhaar’s biometric database—purportedly unique to each individual—with voter records, the ECI aims to eliminate duplicate entries and fraudulent registrations. This is particularly relevant in a country with over 99 crore electors, where manual errors and intentional malpractices have historically plagued the system. The ECI has already linked approximately 66.23 crore Aadhaar numbers to voter IDs as of 2023, suggesting that the infrastructure for such an exercise is partially in place.
In Manipur, the stakes are even higher. The state shares a porous 398-kilometer border with Myanmar, a country embroiled in conflict since the 2021 military coup. This instability has driven an influx of refugees and illegal immigrants into Manipur, some of whom, according to state authorities, have acquired fake identity documents. Former CM N. Biren Singh, in his response to the ECI’s decision on March 19, 2025, cited government data indicating that over 10,000 illegal immigrants had been identified in Manipur since 2018, with many allegedly possessing fraudulent Aadhaar and voter cards. Singh argued that this not only distorts electoral outcomes but poses a threat to national security. For instance, a 2024 NDTV report revealed a racket busted by Manipur police, which uncovered fake Aadhaar and voter IDs issued to Myanmar nationals in Churachandpur district. Singh’s call for a “robust mechanism” to filter out such fake identities underscores the urgency of the ECI’s move in this context.
The legal framework supports this initiative to an extent. Under Section 23(6) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, no voter can be removed from the rolls for failing to provide an Aadhaar number if there is sufficient cause, ensuring the linkage remains voluntary. However, the biometric uniqueness of Aadhaar could serve as a powerful tool to cross-verify identities, aligning with Article 326 of the Constitution, which restricts voting rights to Indian citizens.
In Manipur, where ethnic tensions between the Meitei and Kuki communities have exacerbated since May 2023, ensuring that only legitimate citizens vote could help stabilize the democratic process and reduce allegations of vote manipulation by external actors.
Moreover, the ECI’s move could deter organized electoral fraud. The voluntary collection of Aadhaar numbers, initiated on August 1, 2022, has already provided a database that can be leveraged to flag anomalies. In a state like Manipur, where Singh has claimed that fake voter cards have enabled illegal immigrants to influence local elections, this could restore public trust in the system. The ECI’s technical consultations with the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) promise a sophisticated approach to tackling a problem that manual verification alone cannot address.
The Cons: Privacy, Exclusion, and Practical Hurdles
Despite its potential benefits, the ECI’s plan is not without significant drawbacks, particularly when viewed through the lens of privacy, voter exclusion, and logistical challenges. Critics argue that linking EPIC with Aadhaar threatens the fundamental right to privacy, a concern validated by the Supreme Court’s 2017 Puttaswamy judgment, which recognized privacy as a constitutional right. Aadhaar, while establishing identity, also contains demographic data that, when merged with voter records, could enable profiling and surveillance. In the absence of a robust data protection law—India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, is yet to be fully operational—this raises the specter of misuse by state or private actors, a risk amplified in a politically volatile state like Manipur.
The Cambridge Analytica scandal of 2019 serves as a cautionary tale, where voter data was exploited for political gain. In Manipur, where ethnic divisions are raw, such profiling could deepen mistrust if communities perceive that their voting patterns are being monitored or manipulated. Civil society groups, including the Empowered Action Group of Leaders and Experts (EAGLE) from the Congress party, have warned that the ECI must install “sufficient guardrails” to prevent the disenfranchisement of eligible voters, a concern that resonates in a state already grappling with displaced populations due to violence.
Exclusion is another pressing issue. Aadhaar’s database, while vast, is not infallible. RTI data from 2014-15 revealed 80 million fake or erroneous Aadhaar numbers, and self-reported errors in Aadhaar data are 1.5 times higher than in electoral rolls, according to the 2017-18 State of Aadhaar report. In Manipur, where illegal immigrants have exploited these flaws to obtain fake IDs, the reverse risk exists: genuine citizens without Aadhaar, or with mismatched records, could be erroneously flagged as fraudulent. The Supreme Court’s 2015 interim order, which limited Aadhaar’s mandatory use to welfare schemes, halted the ECI’s earlier National Electoral Rolls Purification and Authentication Program (NERPAP) after it reportedly disenfranchised 55 lakh voters nationwide. In Manipur’s context, where biometric recording of Myanmar refugees is ongoing, distinguishing between legitimate citizens and illegal immigrants could inadvertently exclude tribal or rural populations with limited access to Aadhaar enrollment.
Implementation poses its own challenges. Manipur’s rugged terrain, coupled with ongoing ethnic strife, complicates on-ground verification. Singh’s call for “thorough verification and cross-checking” of government records is sound in theory, but the state’s administrative capacity is stretched thin. The ECI’s reliance on UIDAI’s technical expertise assumes a seamless integration of systems, yet past attempts—like NERPAP—revealed logistical bottlenecks. Moreover, the voluntary nature of the linkage, while legally mandated, is undermined by Form 6B’s lack of an opt-out provision, potentially pressuring voters into compliance and creating a de facto mandatory system.
Manipur’s Unique Context: A Test Case
Manipur exemplifies both the promise and peril of the ECI’s initiative. The state’s border proximity to Myanmar, combined with its history of fake ID rackets, makes it a critical test case. Singh’s figures—10,000 illegal immigrants identified since 2018—highlight a tangible problem that the ECI’s move could address. A 2018 bust in Manipur arrested a woman from Chennai and nine Myanmar nationals with fake Aadhaar cards, while more recent operations in 2024 uncovered similar networks. Linking EPIC with Aadhaar could disrupt these rackets by flagging biometric duplicates, aligning with Singh’s vision of electoral transparency.
Yet, Manipur’s ethnic complexity adds layers of difficulty. The violence since May 2023 has displaced thousands, many of whom lack updated documentation. For these internally displaced persons (IDPs), the risk of exclusion is acute if Aadhaar becomes a gatekeeper to voting rights. Additionally, the state’s police have noted that fake ID networks often operate with cross-border agents, suggesting that technological fixes alone may not suffice without stronger border security and local enforcement—a point Singh himself has tacitly acknowledged by emphasizing on-ground scrutiny.
Weighing the Balance: A Path Forward
The ECI’s move to link EPIC with Aadhaar is a bold step toward electoral purity, particularly in a state like Manipur, where fake voters threaten democratic legitimacy. Its potential to detect illegal immigrants and curb fraud is undeniable, as Singh’s endorsement and the state’s documented challenges attest. However, the risks of privacy violations, voter exclusion, and logistical failures cannot be ignored. The initiative’s success hinges on safeguards: a clear opt-out mechanism, robust data security, and inclusive verification processes that account for Manipur’s unique vulnerabilities.
To balance these pros and cons, the ECI must prioritize transparency and stakeholder consultation, as urged by political parties like Congress. In Manipur, pilot projects could test the linkage’s efficacy, coupled with parallel efforts to strengthen border controls and dismantle fake ID networks. Only then can the ECI ensure that this double-edged sword cuts through fraud without wounding the democratic fabric it seeks to protect. As India’s electoral system evolves, Manipur’s experience will serve as a litmus test for whether technology can uphold, rather than undermine, the right to vote.